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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENTS
PAUL STOCK AND JOE T. JUHAN
PRELI1fiNARY STATEMENT
This analysis of plaintiffs' brief, by appellants and
respondents Paul Stock and Joe T. Juhan, is made
necessary by the form and character of plaintiffs' brief.
We think it appropriate to point out and discuss in
detail many inaccurate, loose and erroneous statements
an::l cone lusions found therein.
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Such misstatements and erroneous conclusions
appear on pages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 33, 35 and 36 of plaintiffs' brief.
Preliminarily, however, let it be noted that the
names of the plaintiffs are not given in the title of their
brief. This is important as will presently appear. Neither
are the names of the defendants stated. This also is
important because the defendants changed.
A true enumeration of .all of the parties
tained in the title hereof.

IS

con-

Plaintiffs' brief has 37 pages. The appendices have
83 pages. This seems to be an abuse of the rules.
Only appendices D, E, F and G to plaintiffs' brief
have any relevancy to the issues here. References herein
to appendices are to plaintiffs brief.
There are 6 plaintiffs; only 4: are included in the
Dece1nber 13, 1955 interlocutory judg1nent and decree.
At page 2 of plaintiffs' brief the author asserts that
"since October of 1944, plaintiffs have owned an undivided half of the \Yorking interest, as to oil, in the
so-called 'Sheridan Lease.' " Now it is in1portant to kno'v
who the plaintiffs are. Does the author 1nean all 6 of
the plaintiffs, or 4 of the plaintiffs, or :2 of the plaintiffs' Why does he require us to speculate on 'vhat
he means~ 1Tnder our theory none of the plainti~fs has
ever owned any rights to the working interest of the
Sheridan Lease.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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October of 1944 is the date of the Stock p,aper. To
claim ownership through that paper is a colossal fraud.
On this point this Court spoke only after mandate and
in the light of an inadequate record.
On January 27, 1948 (Ex. A-22) before the discovery of oil, Meagher Sr. quitclaimed the property to
the other plaintiffs. This deed did not convey the .after
aequired oil rights (see vVeber's brief p. 25 et seq.).
On May 10, 1954, after the discovery of oil, the
Senior Meaghers again quitclaimed the property to their
children. This was to confirm the first deed (Plaintiffs brief page 7). This is the deed that passed the
title to Meaghers' children, if any titled p.assed.
On April16, 1955, the Senior Meaghers still claimed
a personal right to an accounting as if they still o\vned
the property (Rep. Tr. 56). So the statement above
quoted from plaintiffs' brief is untrue. The plaintiffs
since October 1944 have not owned a one-half interest
in the "Sheridan Lease." And the second trial based
on the first quitclaim deed was a fraud on that court.
Again at page 2 (Plaintiffs' brief) it is asserted
"Thus this suit for an accounting was forced upon plaintiffs." That statement is untrue. This suit is more th.an
a suit for an accounting.
In bringing this suit to recover the whole 40.75%
plaintiffs characteristically seek to circumvent the first
mandate and the affirmed Dunford Decree. This the
lower court in this action refused to let plaintiffs do.
See "Rulings on ~1otions" dated October 14, 1955 (R.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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213-215). Those rulings were made in conformity with
our rules and that judgment possesses .all of the formality and dignity that a summary judgment can possess.
There the lower court granted. judgment to defend~nts
on the first and third counts of the complaint; and to
the plaintiffs for an accounting on the second count
of the complaint. The fourth count of the complaint
had long since been dismissed out of the .action (R. 113114). Plaintiffs made no attempt to amend or appeal.
This disposes of pages 27 to 32 of plaintiffs' brief. All
authorities cited by plaintiffs, except 3, go to the lower
court's dismissal of their 4th count. That occurred on
December 21, 1954.

Again at page 2 (Plaintiffs' brief) plaintiffs say
that their rights were so obvious that they were declared
by summary proceedings in this case. On the contrary,
to the lower court it 'vas obvious that if the Dunford
Decree was to be given v.reight, Stock and Juhan jointly
were entitled to one-half of the 40.75~- held by Equity
as stakeholder. That is ,,~hy the lo,Yer court signed
and filed the Dece1nber 13, 1955 order requiring Equity
to pay over to these appellants that an1ount. The order
was in strict harn1ony 'vith the Dunford Decree and
with the lo,ver court's Rulings on )lotions (R. 213-215).

ANALYSIS OF PL.AINTIFFS'
STATEl\fENT OF FACTS
At page 3 of their brief, plaintiffs discuss "the
litigation'' rather than this litigation. They represent
that these appeals bring this controversy to this Court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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for the fourth time. The assertion is untrue-and, moreover, if it be true, these proceedings should be sunlmarily dismissed.
At page 4 (Plaintiffs' brief), plaintiffs again put
1n issue this Court's mandate in No. 6972 (185 P.2d
7-1:7). Plaintiffs state "This Court . . . remanded the
case for further proceedings which, of course, required
determination of the ownership of interests in the lease."
That is a co1npletely untrue statement. Now is the time
to set the record straight and end the repeated intentional falsification of the record.
THE MANDATE (FIRST APPEAL)
The mandate in the first appeal (No. 6972) did
not remand the case for "further proceedings_. which, of
course, required determination of the ownership of
interests in the lease." That statement stems from dishonesty and deceit. It is calculated misstatement.
The mandate is:
"The decision of the lower court is reversed,
and the case remanded to that Court for proceedings to conform to this opinion." (Emphasis
added).
In scores of instances the author of plaintiffs' pleadings and brief has thus intentionally falsified
the mandate. The author of plaintiffs' brief persistently
inserts the word "further" in the mandate and deletes the
words "to conform to this opinion" from the mandate.
He thus emasculates the mandate. This is not inadSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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vertent. It is consciously done. Why does he resort to
this trick~ We do not ch.arge the plaintiffs nor ~1r.
Van Da1n with such conduct. The author's conduct in
this regard, so often resorted to, here and in the lower
court, is a fraud meant to mislead this Court on an ·
important issue.
The author of

t~eir

brief at page 4 says:

"Next, the case reached this Court 1n a
mandamus proceeding."
This case reached the Supreme Court only in this
proceeding. Counsel adroitly says "'the case". Now he
can argue he meant that case, or this case whichever
suits his purpose best. Throughout their brief this
chameleon characteristic persists.
Again on page 5 of plaintiffs' brief he raises the
mandate issue. The author says:
"The third occasion for this Court to act
involved an appeal fron1 the decision of the lo·wer
court after the second trial be!o·zc. ·In tl1at second
trial, the lo,ver court exa1nined all clailns of the
parties to interests in the Sheridan Lease ... "
(Emphasis added).
The only jurisdiction, the only po,ver, the lo,Yer
court possessed after the 1nandate in that case 'vas
revested in it by the re1nittitur. That is the function of
a remittitur. Its jurisdiction "~as li1nited to carrying out
the 1nandate.
'Vhere did the lower court obtain jurisdiction to
gr.ant a new trial '1 Or to per1nit amend1nents to pleadSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ings v? Or to bring in new parties~ And if a new trial
was properly had, why this trial~
And further, in the appeal from the second trial
the povver of this Court was limited to determine if
the lower court had complied with the mandate. If it
had, the appeal should have been dismissed. If it had
not, this Court should have sent the c.ase back with
appropriate instructions. The fact that this Court entertained the appeal from the second trial is proof enough
that the mandate had not been complied with. See
K rant.z v. Rio Grande TV estern Ry. Co., 13 Utah 1, 43
P. 623, and Helper State Bank v. Crus, 95 lTtah 320,
81 P.2d 359 at page 363, and other Utah cases.
If the mandate was not complied with these appellants are entitled to a trial on the merits of the issues
formed by the pleadings.
If the mandate w.as complied with these appellants
are entitled to the fruits of the Dunford Decree, i.e.
¥2 of the 40.75%.
At the top of page 6 of their brief plaintiffs say
this suit was cornmenced " . . . to declare plaintiffs'
rights as against Equity Oil Company and vVeber Oil
Co1npany, and to obta-in an accounting and puyment
from all defendants." Plaintiffs' proposed interlocutory
judgment and decree does not do that. Plaintiffs led
the lower court into error and now seek to have that
decree changed, corrected or reversed. One cannot induce
a court to commit error and then take .advantage of
that error.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND
(Plaintiffs' brief p. 6)
At pages 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of their brief the
author re-states past events commencing with October
21, 194+. This is past history. This is not a "statement
of the case'' as provided by the rules. It is no aid to
this eourt. To support his theory, he cites Civil No.
2238 in the second trial (after mandate) eight times.
Plain tiffs clai1n two final decrees. They now seek another. It is difficult for one to understand why plaintiffs did not, in the first place, try all the issues against
all of the parties defendant in favor of all of the parties
plaintiff. Son1eti1ne plaintiffs' right to further litigate
will be exausted. ~faybe that time has already arrived.
At page 11 of their brief the author sa:Ts that the
District Court granted the interlocutory summary judgJnent. It could grant only one sueh judgment. That is
the judgment of October 1-l-, 1955 (R. 213-215). Under
rule 56 (d) this judgn1ent is not appealable. The appeal
from the interlocutory judgn1ent and decree of Decenlber 13, 1955, is abortive because that decree is n1ere
surplusage. Plaintiffs' appeal should be disn1issed.
The lo,ver court in this case did not find or decree
in its October 1±, 1955 Rulings that the title clain1ed
by the plaintiffs is valid against Equity and Weber.
It decided just the opposite (R. 213-215).
The .author at page 12 of plaintiffs' brief puts the
word "mistakenly" in the Judge ~s n1outh. In his order
of December 15, 1955, the Judge gave two reasons for
his order. Neither is based on "mistake'' (R. 2-l-6). The
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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orders of Decen1ber 13, 1955 and December 15, 1955
will be hereinafter discussed.
Again on page 14 (Plaintiffs' brief) the author
refers to the December 15, 1955 order, as "expressly"
stating that the December 13, 1955 order was "entered by
n1istake" and is vacated as being in conflict with
the "Interlocutory Judgment and Decree". The word
"mistake" is not in the December 15, 1955 order. And th~
December 13, 1955 order could not be in conflict with
the interlocutory judgment and decree of the same date
for the simple reason that that decree is a nullity-being
mere surplusage.
PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENT
(Plaintiffs' brief p. 15)
The author of plaintiffs' brief persistently refuses
to correctly state the record. He adds to, subtracts from,
and otherwise consciously perverts what Mr. Van Dam
says (R. 249-251) and \Vhat the trial judge s.aid. We
pass the improprieties involved.
Commencing with page 14 of plaintiffs' brief, the
author thereof records what the judge told Mr. v:ran
Dam and what l\fr. \Tan Dam told the judge. Co1npare
that with Nir. Van Dam's .affidavit, Appendix G 1 - G 4.
Mr. Wheat's Statements.
Mr. Wheat:
"The judge stated that Mr.
Musser had presented an
order on behalf of Stock and
Juhan" (Plaintiffs' brief 17).

Mr. Van Dam's Statements.
Mr. Van Dam:
"Then Judge Tuckett said that
Mr. Musser had presented an
order to him in behalf of defendants Stock and Juhan,
and asked me if we objected
to it" (Mr. Van Dam did
not). (App. G-1).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Mr. vVheat deleted "and asked me if we objected to
it" and the fact that Mr. Van Dam did not object to it.
Mr. Wheat:
"Mr. Van Dam asked the
Judge if the order affected
the interests of plaintiffs
under the interlocutory j udgment and decree, and the
Judge said that it did not"
(Plaintiffs' brief 17).

Mr. Van Dam:
"I asked him (Judge Tuckett)
whether the order would have
any effect upon the rights
of plaintiffs under the Interlocutory Judgment and Decree. He said it was his
understanding that it VJould
not." (App. G-1, G-2).

1Ir. Wheat deleted the italicized words.
lVIr. Wheat:
"Mr Van Dam then pointed
out to the Judge that such
an order would concern the
plaintiffs because the impounded funds do not include
<:tll of the oil proceeds but
1:mpound only the plaintiffs'
half" (Plaintiffs' brief 17).

Mr. Van Dam:
"I then told him it seemed to
me that the order was in conflict with the Interlocutory
Judgment and Decree, and had
the effect of distributing
part of the impounded funds
both to plaintiffs and to defendants Stock and Juhan at
the same time.~' (App. G-2).

nir. vVhe.at puts the italicized \Yords in the mouth
of l\fr. \ 7 an Da1n. This is inexcusable.
l\1r. Wheat:
"The Judge said he had no
intention of awarding the defendants anything to which
the plaintiffs are entitled
under the Interlocutory Judgment and Decree." (Plaintiffs'
brief 17).

l\lr. Van Dam:
"Judge Tuckett said he did
not intend to do any such
thing. and stated that he
would withhold the order
(which had already been filed
and entered R. 263) and take
it back with him to Provo.
(App. G-2).

Mr. 'Vhe.at adds and deletes the italicized \Yords
fron1 .and to \vhat Mr. \Tan Dan1 said. (The Dece1nber
13, 1955 order does not award anything to these appellants that plaintiffs are entitled to.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Mr. Wheat:
"He also said he would withhold the order***. The judge
instructed Mr. Van Dam to advise counsel with respect to
the situation, and Mr. Van
Dam did so" (Plaintiffs' brief
17).
~.fr.

Mr. Van Dam:
"He requested me . . . to
notify Mr. Musser of his intentions with respect to the
order." (Mr. Van Dam tried
to contact Mr. Musser but was
unable to.) (App. G-2).

Wheat adds the italicized words "and he did

so."
On page 18 (Plaintiffs' brief) the author states:
"The vacating order of December 15th confirms the
foregoing ... " It does no such thing. It does assign as
the ground for trying to revoke the order of December
13th the .assertion that said order conflicts with the
decree of the same date. That ground is wholly insufficient because the decree of December 13th is a nullity.
RULINGS ON 1\10TIONS
On page 18 of plaintiffs' brief, the last line, the
author characterizes the "Rulings on Motions" as a
memorandunt decision and states: "By memorand1~m decision entitled "Rulings on Motions," dated October 14,
1955, ... ''
This statement of the .author of plaintiffs' brief is
deliberately, palpably and, again, inexcusably false. The
"Rulings on Motions" of October 14, 1955, are so iinportant in these proceedings that these appellants set portions of it out herein.
The trial judge's "Rulings on Motion" is not a
memorandurn decision of the District Judge. It is a
formal summary judgment made and entered "By the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Court'' under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and possesses all of the formality and dignity that any
such judgment can possess. It is the judgment pursuant
to the motions for summary judgment. With the greatest fidelity the trial judge adhered to our rules relating
to summary judgment. On the other hand the interlocutory judgment and decree of December 13, 1955, is
surplusage. The trial judge unfortunately was led into
error by the telephone conversations (R. 255-257 and
264).
These appellants specifically call tllis Court's attention to the affidavit of ~Ir. \Tan Dam (R. 255-257), Appendix G to plaintiffs' brief, and to :Jir. ~fusser's affidavit (R. 266). These affidavits sho"~ .an amazing course
of conduct involving grave improprieties.
"RlTLINGS OX :JIOTIOXS
(R. :213-215)
N 0. 3228 CiYil
In this matter the Plaintiffs, as well as the
Defendants Joe T. Juhan, P.aul Stock, and the
Equity Oil Company, a Corporation, have filed
Motions for Summary Judgment.

•••
The Equity Oil Company appears only as a
stakeholder. It has, pursuant to agreement with
the Plaintiffs, maintained .a special account of
an amount equal to at least 40.75 per cent of the
gross crude oil runs after expenses of operations.
The Plaintiffs are entitled to a Summary
Judgment against the Equity Oil Company, on
the second count of Plaintiffs' complaint; for .an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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accounting of the operations and profits of the
oil produced by said Defendant on the lands in
question; and to a judgment against said Defendants Equity Oil Company for an amount equal to
one-half the proceeds after operating expenses .
are deducted. (Emphasis added.)
In the first count of Plaintiffs' Complaint,
the Plaintiffs seek to quiet title to their interest
under the Sheridan lease. These issues were tried
and determined in the prior case and the plaintiffs cannot retry the same issues. The Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are gr.anted
as to the first and third counts of the Plaintiffs'
Complaint.
Dated at Provo, Utah, this 14th day of October,
1955.
BY THE COURT:
R. L. Tuckett"
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED
INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT AND DECREE
On Page 19 (Plaintiffs' brief) the author says:
"Defendants Stock and Juhan proposed no
form of decree, but did file objections to the form
submitted by plaintiffs ... " (First italics theirs,
second ours).
There is not an iota of truth in the above statement. The objections to plaintiffs' propo_sed interlocutory judgment and decree contain 4 pages (R. 230-234)
and adopts Weber's objections (R. 235).
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The first paragraph of the objections is:
"Defendants Paul Stock and Joe T. Juhan
object to plaintiffs' proposed 'Interlocutory Judgment and Decree' filed herein and the whole
thereof for the reasons and because of the objections herein contained, and the objections filed
herein by Weber Oil Contpany." (R. 230). (Emphasis added.)
Included in appellants' objections is the following:
"Under the Dunford decree, as affirmed,
these individual defendants have jointly a full
one-fourth interest as to oil in the Sheridan
Lease, which interest was carved out of the Stock
one-half interest and 'vhich was 'the principal
subject of litigation' in Case No. 2238, after
mandate.
If the decree in No. 2238 is a final judgInent upon which plaintiffs can and do rely,
they cannot be heard to urge the entry of their
proposed judgment decreeing to them the property the former judgn1ent decreed to these defendants. That conclusion is unassailable. In
moving this Court to grant their motion for summary judgment against these defendants, plaintiffs attack the former judgment of this Court
and seek to have it declared to be a nullity.
That conclusion is unassailable.

•••
If the judgment in 2238, after mandate, is
a final adjudication as claimed by plaintiffs, their
motion for sun1mary judgment herein must be
denied.
If the judgment in 2238 is not a final adjudication as it is now treated by plaintiffs herein,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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their motion for summary judgment cannot be
granted. A trial of all the issues joined is the
alternative.
:111

•

•

The Court herein has ruled that all partiesplaintiffs and defendants, except Weber, are
bound by the former decree. To proffer plaintiffs' proposed Interlocutory Judgment and Decree contradicts plaintiffs' complaint, holds for
naught the Dunford decree, disregards the
Supreme Court's affirmation of the Dunford decree, is contrary to plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment, ignores the rulings of this Court herein and is a brazen attempt to lead this Court into
grev1ous error.
:i

* •

DATED this lOth day of November, 1955."
(R. 232, 233, 234).
These objections go to the merits of plaintiffs' proposed interlocutory judgment and decree. They cannot
be tortured into a mere objection to form. The author's
misstatement of the record is not inadvertent. It is
much graver than that. It goes to professional honesty.
We sincerely believe these deceptions will not profit him.
THE SUB~IISSIONS WITHOUT ORAL ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs' brief, page 20, contains 1\tir. Wheat's
letter submitting the matters to Judge Tuckett without
oral argUment. In their letter they misstate the letters
of Weber and of Stock and Juhan and pervert these
letters into a submission of the "form" of interlocutory
judgment and decree without oral argument. These
letters are as follows: (Mr. Gustin's letter and Mr. Mus-
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ser's letter are not in the record. They are referred to
by Mr. Wheat. If desirable we will ask for a diminution
of the record to include them.)
"November 19, 1955
Honorable R. L. Tuckett
Judge, District Court
City and County Building
Provo, Utah
Sir:
Re: Meagher et al v. Equity Oil Company et
al. Uintah County, Civil No. 3228
We intended our letter to you of November
10, 1955, re above subject, with which we transmitted to you our 'Objections and Motion', to be
a submission on our part of said objections and
motion without further argument. That letter
and the referred to objections and motion now do
not seem quite clear with respect to said submission. We do respectfully submit for your decision
said objections and motion without further argument.
We desire to be heard only in the event other
parties are heard and you desire to hear orally
from us.
Respectfully,
Burton W. Musser
cc: Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Harley W. Gustin
Gilbert C. Wheat
Herbert "'\Tan Dam
Richard Downing
Oliver W. Steadman''
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"GlTSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON
Attorneys-at-Law
Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
November 21, 1955
Honorable R. L. Tuckett
Judge, District Court
City and County Building
Provo, Utah
Dear Judge Tuckett :
Re: Meagher et al. v. Equity Oil Company
et .al. (Uintah County Civil Case
3228)
We have a copy of Mr. Musser's letter directed to you under date of November 19th. On
behalf of Weber Oil Company and Equity Oil
Company we subscribe to the same course of
procedure suggested by Mr. Musser, provided, of
course, the plaintiffs are not heard orally.
If the matters are to be submitted without
further oral argument, we call attention to an
error in our proposed form of judgment which
w.as handed to you on October 22nd last. On the
second page in the third line of paragraph numbered 1 the date 'January 4, 1924' should be
'June 4, 1924.'
Respectfully yours,
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON
By Harley W. Gustin
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cc: Mr. Gilbert C. Wheat
Mr. Herbert Van Dam
Mr. Richard Downing
Mr. Oliver W. Steadman
Mr. Burton W. 1\Iusser"
LILLICK, GEARY, OLSON,
& CHARLES
Attorneys at Law

ADA~IS

San Francisco 4, California
November 21, 1955
Honorable R. L. Tuckett
Judge of the District Court
Provo
Meagher, et al v.
Equity Oil Company, et al
No. 3228-Civil
Dear Judge Tuckett :
Mr. 'ran Da1n has advised me that Mr.
Gustin, in behalf of defendants Equity Oil Company and
eber Oil Company~ and Mr. Musser,
in behalf of defendants Paul Stock and Joe T.
Juhan, have suggested that the settlement of the
form of Interloeutory Judgn1ent and Decree be
submitted "'"ithout oral argument.

''r

If you consider that the matter has been
adequately presented in the rarious proposals
for decree and ob.fections u. . .lz,ich a're before yo1l
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now, we are agreeable to having the matter stand
as submitted. (Emphasis added).

Yours very truly,
Gilbert C. Wheat
5:9:12337

cc. Messrs. Gustin
Musser
Steadman
Downing
This letter is not an objection to our motion for
one-half of the 40.75% nor an objection to its submission
to the court.
The author's misinterpretation of these letters is
one more attempt to mislead this Court. Plaintiffs submitted everything that was before the court. The .author
is haggling over the plain meaning of vvords. His claim
that there 'vas no submission does not excuse him for
failing to object to the motion. Finally he must admit
that there \vas no objection and could be no objection
to the motion which culminated in the December 13,
1955 order in f.avor of Stock and Juhan. If Mr. Wheat
did not submit Mr. Musser's motion by the same token
_jir. :r.Jusser did not submit Mr. Wheat's decree. It is
nonsense.
At page 21 of their brief plaintiffs suggest that the
December 15, 1955 order may be voidable and then ask
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"· · . this Court to clarify the record either by reversing
the inadvertent order of December 13th, or by affirming
the (voidable) order of December 15th, ... "
"Any port in a storm."
On pages 21 and 22 of plaintiffs' brief, plaintiffs
seek an amendment of the interlocutory judgment and
decree proposed by them, and which was not changed
by the judge (App. G-1). Mr. Van Dam says: "I asked
him if he had made any change in it, and he said he
had made none." (App. G-1, G-4). The judge signed the
interlocutory judgment and decree in the exact form
and language of plaintiffs. It does not now lie in their
mouths to ask this Court to cure an error deliberately
invi ted and insisted on by plaintiffs.
On p.ages 22 and 23 of plaintiffs' brief under the
heading "3" plaintiffs say: "Possibly this Court will
deem this issue to be beyond the scope of this appeal."
(This is an understaten1ent.) "If so, plaintiffs request
a clear declaration to that effect to avoid further controversy.'' That is to say, this Court "\Yithout pleadings,
without he.aring and "\Yithout facts should 1nake a '"clear
declaration" to carry out an ohYious falsehood.
Pages 22 to 27 (Plaintiffs~ brief) consist of irrelevant incoherencie~. ''; e belieYe this Court "\vill ignore
the1n. Pages '27 to 32 (Plaintiffs' brief) are effec.tiYely
dealt "\vith in \\T eber Oil Con1pany s brief page ~7. e
adopt that.
1

'r

All parties seek .a dis1nissal or reyersal of these
appeals ~o far a~ they relate to the Dece1nber 13, 1955
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interlocutory juC!g1nent and decree.
These appellants seek the revocation of the December 15, 1955 order.
Plaintiffs request, on reversal, (Plaintiffs' brief,
p. 36, para. 3) that this Court, on this .appeal, adjudicate that Equity, Weber and these appellants, Stock
and Juhan, are jointly and severally bound by the interlocutory judgment and decree, or, in the alternative,
declare that the interlocutory judgment and decree does
not diminish the obligations of vVeber, Stock and Juhan
as the same may be determined in further proceedings
below.
Plaintiffs also request, on reversal, (Plaintiffs' brief,
p. 36, para. 4) that Equity is responsible to plaintiffs
jointly and severally with defendants Weber, Stock and
Juhan, and to the same extent defendants \Veber, Stock
.and Juhan, are so obliged (sic) .
Plaintiffs also request, on reversal, (Plaintiffs' brief,
p. 36, para. 6) that this Court, on this appeal, direct
the lower court to conduct further proceedings not
expressly or specifically determined by the interlocutory
judgment and decree. As this decree is void, what IS
this Court going to direct the lower court to do~
Each of these requests is inconsistent with reason
and common sense and therefore each is absurd. So far
as plaintiffs' appeal is concerned this is another abortive
and time consuming procedure.
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Weber Oil Company has 1n accordance with the
rules and in a highly factual and lawyer-like manner
1nade a "Statement of The Case." We respectfully ask
leave to, and we do, adopt its statement of the case.
The author of plaintiffs' brief refuses to abide by
the laws and rules of this State relating to summarv
judgments 1 ; he refuses to be bound by the mandates
of this Court 2 ; he refuses to conform to our la-\YS relating '
to appeals 3 ; he refuses to prepare his brief in conformance to our rules 4 ; he misstates and falsifies the
record 5 ; he will not abide by rulings of the Court6 ; he
piteously cries for "American Justice"': Plaintiffs' brief
is a fraud. It is filled 'Yith deceit, trickery and sharp
practices by \vhich the author seeks to gain an unfair
and dishonest advantage.

1

See Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

2

The mandates in the first and second appeals have not been complied with.

3

Only final jud1nents can be appealed from.

4

As to size and contents of briefs.

G

There was a submission by all parties of all pending matters to the
lower court; these appell-ants objected to the plaintiffs' proffered
interlocutory judgment and decree as a whole and not n1erely
as to form; the lower court's "Rulings on !Motions" is not a mere
memorandum descision; the author puts \Vords in the mouths of
his associate and of the trial judge etc., etc. Plaintiffs' "The
factual background" is saturated with over statements, misstatements, additions and deletions.

6

Judge ·Tuckett's "Rulings on Motions" of October 14, 1955, is the
l·aw of this case up to this point and until the issues below are
tried. ·Plaintiffs' interlocutory judgment and decree is a phoney
and a nullity.

7

Plain tiffs' brief pages 36 to 37.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The December 15, 1955 order, seeking to revoke
the December 13, 1955 order, should be vacated
because:

(a) The lovver court \Vas without power to revoke its formal order on the grounds stated,
and
(b) These appellants were entitled to notice an_d.-.

~·

a hearing on the December 15, 1955 order._.

2. The so-called interlocutory judgment and decree
of December 13, 1955, as proposed by plaintiffs,
is surplusage. It isn't a final appealable judgment.
ARGUMENT

1. Tl-!E DECEMBER 15, 1955 ORDER SHOULD
BE REVOKED.
This order is dated at Provo, Utah, December 15,
1955, and was filed at Vernal, Utah, December 17, 1955
(R. 246). It \vas signed without notice to these appellants and vvithout a hearing.
There are two grounds of revocation expressed in
the order : ( 1) There is no issue of law or of fact presented by the pleadings on file upon which said order
could be based; and (2) That said order is in conflict
vvith the interlocutory judgment and decree entered in
said cause on the 13th day of December, 1955.
(1) It isn't clear what the trial judge means by his
first ground. These appellants had a judgement. That
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24
ju·dgment had been affirmed by this Court (255 P. 2d
989). As affairmed the judgment had been invoked
against these appellants. Unless everything after the
mandate is a nullity, these appellants' judgment was
enforce.able. Equity Oil Company was holding the money
until the further order of the court (R. 123-125). The
motion of Stock and Juhan sought a further order of the
court (R. 234). The motion upon which the order was
based was not objected to by any party. It had been
confessed by all parties. It had been duly submitted for
decision by all parties (This brief p. 16). By their lack
of ·action or objection to the motion plaintiffs disclaim
all interest in the ~2 of 40.75%, the subject matter of
the motion. The motion was served on all parties and
pended for 30 days.
The trial judge's first ground is untenable.
( 2) The second ground given by the trial judge is
more obscure than the first. While the clerk's records
show the entry of the December 13, 1955 order before
the entry of the D·ecember 13th interlocutory judgment
and decree, the probability is that they were signed
simultaneously and deposited together vvith the clerk.
Philosophically it cannot be determined \\~hich, if either,
is in conflict with the other, except as 'vill nov~T be shown.
Under our rules the Decemher 13, 1955 interlocutory
judg1nent and decree is surplusage (Rule 56, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure). There is no statute or rule giving
the lower court jurisdiction or power to enter the socalled December 13th interlocutory judgment ·and decree.
rrhe lower court had made its rulings on motions for
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summary judgment on October 14, 1955 (R. 213-215),
and that court had no jurisdiction or power to enter
any other interlocutory judgrnent and decree.
Appellants' order of December 13, 1955, could not
possibly be in conflict with the interlocutory judgment
and decree of December 13, 1955, beeause that decree
could not and did not legally exist. It is mere surplusage~
It is based on no statute or rule or practice, it was and
is error. It does not and connot supplant, augment, take
away from or change in the slightest particular the
October 14, 1955 "Rulings on ~1otions" of the lower
court.
So the lower court was not in error on either of the
grounds mentioned when it entered the December 13,
1955 order in favor of these appellants. But if it had
been it cannot use that error to recall, vacate or set aside
an entered order previously made by it.

Blankenship v. Royalty Iiolding Co. (C.C.A. lOth
Cir.), 202 F. 2d 77.
''Courts possess the inherent power to correct errors in the records evidencing the judgment pronounced by the court so as to make them
speak the truth by actually reflecting that which
was in fact done. They do not, however, possess
the power to correct an error by the court in
rendering a judgment it did not intend to render
and by such an order change a judgment actually
but erroneously pronounced by the court to the
one the court intended to record. With these
principles all courts are in accord."
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2. THE INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT AND
DECREE OF DECEMBER 13, 1955, IS BY ITS
VERY NATURE INTERLOCUTORY AND
NOT APPEALABLE.
Paragraph 9 of that judgment and decree (R. 216224) reserves the question of fact to be determined by
the trial court and paragraph 10 thereof decrees that the
judgment and decree is interlocutory and reserves
further questions for further action by the court. Pages
12, 21 and 22 of plaintiff's brief emphasizes the point.
At 'page 22 plaintiffs state:
"Again, because of the interlocutory nature of
the interlocutory Judgment and Decree, plaintiffs
are at a disadvantage in analyzing its final effect
upon their rights."
Under our Constitution only final judgments are
appealable. Free1nan on Jttdgntents, Vol. 1, Section 22,
page 34~, defines a final judgment and quotes the follo\vIng:
" 'A decree is final for the purposes of an
appeal to this court when it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the
case, and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution \Yhat has been deter1nined.' "
An interlocutory decree is defined by the san1e author
in Section 38, page 63 :
"An interlocutory decree is one made 'pending the cause, and before a final hearing on the
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merits. A final decree is one which disposes of
the cause, either by sending it out of the eourt
before a hearing is had on the merits, or after a
hearing on the merits, decreeing either in favor of
or against the prayer of the bill.' But no order
or decree which does not preclude further proceedings in the case in the court below should be
considered final. "
Rule 72(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides
for an appeal from final judgments. The appeal herein
is taken frorn the granting of a motion for summary
judgment and is pursuant to Rule 56 (d), Utah Rules of
Civil Proced~tre. This rule provides that a summary
judgment may be granted vvhere all of the issues are not
determined and a trial is necessary. The fourth paragraph of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
states:
" ( 4) That further proceeding shall be taken

in this proceeding to state said account and determine all issues which remain undisposed of
by said interlocutory su1nmary decrees;" (R.
163).

\Vhere an order of summary judgment is granted
without disposing of all of the issues, such an order of
summary judgment is not a judgment from which an
appeal lies under Rule 54(a), Utah Rules of Civil Proced1tre, citing Big gin v. Otlmer I ron W arks ( C.C.A. 7th
Cir.), 154 F. 2d 214.
There is no appeal from the interlocutory judgment
and decree of December 13, 1955, either by way of intermediate appeal pursuant to Rule 72.(b) or an appeal
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under Rule 72(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
lower court's "Rulings on Motions" of October 14, 1955,
supra, \vas 1nade pursuant to motions for summary judglnent. Those rulings are in strict conformity \Vith our
rules. No appeal lies therefrom.
The importance of the situation is emphasized by
the jurisdictional question involved and the possibility
of further unnecessary litigation if this Court acts in a
matter \Yhere jurisdiction is lacking.
.L11 c Pwen v. 11! cE1cen, ________ Or ....... , 280 P. 2d 402:

"It is from the foregoing decree that defendants have appealed to this court. It is manifest
that this is not a final decree. Winters v. Grimes,
124 Or. 214, 264 P. 359.

* * *
Under the decree in the instant case, the parties are directed to account. A further hearing
and determination by the court upon such accounting is necessary. Until the accounting is had and
finally settled by the court the decree cannot become final. Robertson v. Henderson, 181 Or. 200,
202, 179 P. 2d 74~; ~Iuellhaupt v. Joseph A.
Strawbridge Estate Co., 136 Or. 99, 298 P. 186.
Whether a right of appeal exists is a jurisdictional question. lT nless an appeal is authorized by the statute, this court has no jurisdiction
to consider it. Jurisdiction of the supreme court
eannot be conferred by consent, agTeement or
"'raiver of the parties litigant. Liimatainen Y.
State Industrial Accident Commission, 118 Or.
260, 277, 246 P. 7-~1: Catlin v. Jones, 56 Or. 49~~
494, 1OS P. 633.
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When want of jurisdiction appears at any
stage of the proceedings it is the duty of the
court, on its own motion, to refuse to proceed
further. Ehrstrom v. Baum, 159 Or. 299, 300, 79
P. 2d 991; Spokane Merchants' Association v.
Gollihur, 122 Or. 146, 257 P. 812; Dippold v. Cathlamet Timber Co., 98 Or. 183, 193 P. 909; Rynearson v. Union County, 54 Or. 181, 184, 102 P. 785.

In 2 Am. Jur. 860, Appeal and Error, Section
22, it is stated
'A judgment, order, or decree, to be final
for purposes of an appeal or error, must dispose of the cause, or a distinct branch thereof,
as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or directions for future determination. It
must finally dispose of the whole subject-matter
or be a termination of the particular proceedings or action, leaving nothing to be done but
to enforce by execution what has been determined. * * *' (Italics ours.)
See also In re Norton's Estate, 175 Or. 115,
151 P. 2d 719, 156 A.L.R. 617; Abrahamson v.
Northwestern Pulp & Paper Co., 141 Or. 339, 15
P. 2d 472, 17 P. 2d 1117; Watkins v. Mason, 11
Or. 72, 4 P. 524.
No motion was filed in this court to dismiss
this appeal. However, it clearly appearing that
the decree as a whole is interlocutory and not
final, this court is without jurisdiction to review
the proceeding. In such circumstances, it is the
duty of the court to dismiss the appeal on its
own motion.''
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CONCLUSION
The litigation complained of by plaintiffs from
1944 to date-and there must be more, suggests the
desirability of bringing it to a close. This much desired
end can be brought about, we believe, in only one way,
that is, for this Court to enforce its judgment as reflected
in its mandate in Case No. 6792 (185 P. 2d 747), and
to hold that everything that occurred in Case No. 2238
(before Judge Dunford) after mandate is a nullity. No'v
the slate is clean. The parties can proceed from that
starting point as they are advised. Without such a
declaration by this Court the end of litigation is not
in sight for at every step, even on execution, the parties
affected may invoke their property rights to and under
this Court's judgment. These rights are guaranteed by
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of this State, and
by the Constitution of the United States.

Respectfully subn1itted,
BURTON \Y.. !fUSSER
RICHARD DOWNING
OLI\TER W. STEAD!IAK

Attorneys for Appellants and
Respondent Paul Sto·ck and
Joe T. JUft.an.
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